Tunisia: Unprecedented ground operation to eradicate militant strongholds in Chaambi Mountains likely to increase jihadist efforts to stage attacks

Current Situation

On April 21, the Tunisian Defense Ministry annTunisiaounced that security forces in the Chaambi Mountains were “gaining ground” against jihadists located in the region, as the military started joint operations involving both ground forces, fighter jets, and helicopters, as well as artillery and mortar shelling. According to the statement, the goal of the operations is to seize control over the entire area that fell under militant control in 2012. Such militant groups include the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, as well as Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), with AST considered the most active of the three in the country.

  • On April 11, the Tunisian President extended the closed military zone in Chaambi to neighboring mountains of Sammama, Salloum, and Meghila while on April 16 ground reinforcements were reportedly sent to the region. On April 21 Prime Minister Mehdi Ben Jemaa pledged to eliminate jihadist groups threatening the country while stating that security forces were “moving to the highest point of the mountains”. On May 6 during a visit in the region, President Moncef Marzouki offered amnesty for jihadists “without blood on their hands”.

  • On April 18 following clashes with militants and security forces in the region, an officer was killed during the explosion of a mine as he and three other soldiers were patrolling the area in a military vehicle. The Tunisian air force then carried several airstrikes on suspected militants positions in the region, while clashes were reported outside the closed military zone, near the industrial area in Kasserine on April 23.

  • The operation follows intermittent artillery strikes on the area on April 9-11, March 25, February 4-6 and December 31-January 1. However, following deadly clashes between Tunisian ground forces and militants in August 2013, ground operations were halted.

  • According to an April 28 official government statement, Tunisian anti-terrorist brigades arrested nine suspected jihadists following a security raid in Douar Hicher in the La Manouba District and in the Ettadhamen District near Tunis. According to a communique published by the Interior Ministry, the suspected jihadists were reportedly planning attacks and are linked to other wanted militants remaining at large.

Assessments: Launching of unprecedented operation underscores both Tunisia’s bolstered military capabilities, persistence of jihadist threat

  1. The operations in Chaambi are likely meant to represent the last step of a counter-offensive carried out after the suffering of several setbacks including the assassination of two opposition figures by AST militants respectively in February and July 2013, as well as a suicide bombing in the coastal city of Sousse in October. Prior to the commencement of the ground operations in the Chaambi Mountains, Tunisian security forces raided two major militants hideouts in and near Tunis, leading to the arrest and killing of high-ranking members of AST. The capture of senior members of the organization likely enabled critical intelligence-gathering on jihadists from Chaambi, particularly given several of the captured militants are believed to have spent time in the jihadist stronghold.

  2. The involvement of combined forces including ground troops underscores that the operation does not aim at containing the threat, but rather to permanently root militants from their strongholds. This likely further comes from the assessment that the harsh winter weakened the militants, with reports indicating that on April 7 security forces arrested a Moroccan militant while he was attempting to  flee the mountains, described as in a state of “extreme hunger and fatigue. While such an impact of the harsh winter weather likely remains relevant given indications that militants are hidden in the highest parts of the mountains to prevent losses from artillery fire, the terrain in the region as well as the use of mines will likely extend the length of the operations to several months.

  3. Beyond such factors, the passage of a new electoral law thus enabling the holding of elections likely significantly factored into the decision to launch such counter-militancy operations.  The 2013 assassinations of two opposition leaders led to significant political tensions with claims that the Islamist-led government left jihadist activities unchecked. Despite the recent stabilization of political tensions with the nomination of a new neutral administration in January, the government likely decided to launch the operation as means to prevent the renewal of such political instability before the elections, expected to be held in November.

Assessments: Jihadist perception that operations represent strategic shift in ongoing balance could prompt attacks to alleviate military pressure     

  1. The two February raids on militants hideouts in and near Tunis prompted an attack on February 16 near the Algerian border when militants erected a fake checkpoint and fired at passing security cars killing four. In this context, such attacks in Tunisia’s outlying areas a week after the raids in the capital reflects the militant strategy of maintaining a persistently high level of threat in both coastal and interior regions. Such a strategy involves the staging of attacks in retaliation to security forces operations so as to maintain a visible presence in the country, while the location of the attacks  are likely aimed to stretch the country’s limited military and security capabilities throughout the interior and coastal regions. In this context security operations in the capital would prompt attacks in outlying areas while accordingly, the ground operation in Chaambi is liable to encourage attacks in coastal cities.  This was further underscored by an April 28 a raid on a jihadist hideout in Douar Hicher, which led to the arrest of nine suspected jihadists who were reportedly “planning attacks”, according to an official statement.

  2. We assess that while the initial jihadist strategy was intended to increasingly garner popular support through social work in order to maintain support for an eventual shift toward more violent activities, each uptick in government crackdowns has forced jihadists to push forward with such a shift toward attacks rather than political or social activity. For this reason, the sentiment that the operation represents an unprecedented step toward curbing militancy in Tunisia could further change such a balance between violent and social activities. Such perception could already prompted a change in AST’s priority, with AST’s leader reportedly requesting the return of Tunisian jihadists fighting in Syria during a meeting between several regional militant groups in September.

  3. In this context, the ongoing military operation is likely to expedite the timeframe for a potential attack, given that the government counter-militancy efforts are likely to significantly hinder militant capabilities. The militants could further use their connections in known Salafists districts of Tunis such as al-Intikala, Le Kram, Ettadhamen, Ibn Khaledoun, Ennasr, Ariana, Bab el-Khadra, Mornaguia, and Manouba as a means to stage attacks.

  4. Finally given the string of security operations likely have hindered the jihadist groups capacities to stage attacks, local jihadist are likely to request additional assistance from broader militant networks in the region such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, AST’s counterpart in Tunisia’s neighboring country. While on the western border, Tunisian security forces are cooperating with Algerian forces, the border with Libya remains a focal point for both criminal and militant activities, involving the smuggling of drugs and weapons as well as the passage of militants to and from Libya. A wave of protests in Ben Guerdane following the closure of the border checkpoint of Ras Jedir underscores the importance of such cross-border activities, thus further highlighting the difficulty to eliminate such illegal smuggling networks. With this in mind, while the operations in Chaambi represent an unprecedented opportunity for Tunisian security forces to curb the militancy threat in the country, its long-term efficiency as well as the ability of militants to conduct attacks during the operation will likely depend on security forces’ ability to reassert its control over the southern border. The recent deployment of 5,000 soldiers at the border with Libya, while officially prompted by concerns regarding the security situation following an offensive on Islamist militants in Benghazi, could be used as means to permanently secure the border and prevent any infiltration attempts from the neighboring country.