Since October 7, 2023, Israel has significantly degraded two critical elements of Iran’s regional “Axis of Resistance,” Hamas and Hezbollah, with the latter being the most prominent proxy that bolstered Iran’s regional influence and standing. These developments also prompted direct exchanges of fire between Iran and Israel, the latest of which were extensive Israeli airstrikes in October 2024 that significantly hobbled Iran’s aerial defense umbrella. Compounding the diminishment of Iran’s regional axis, the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria delivered another severe blow to Iran’s regional strategy. This meant Tehran’s primary ally who facilitated Iran’s buildup in Syria and arms shipment to Hezbollah was toppled. This will increase Iran’s threat perception and desire to seek ways to reconstitute its regional deterrence against its rival camp—Israel, the US, and the US-aligned Middle Eastern countries led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Another consequence of the toppling of al-Assad’s government in Syria is that Turkey’s prominence as a regional power will increase. This is because it is the first time in which direct and prolonged Turkish intervention in a civil war, through material support as well as the cultivation of Turkish proxies with Sunni Islamist orientations, resulted in a takeover by the factions it has been supporting. This will likely give Ankara primacy in extending its influence over the new Syrian regime, translating into greater geopolitical and economic clout. As it comes at the expense of the Iran-led Axis of Resistance camp, it will likely bolster a regional, Ankara-led camp of Sunni Islamist-oriented states, that primarily includes itself and its close ally, Qatar. As its first grand project, this camp will likely dedicate efforts to stabilize the new Syrian regime. Subsequently, it will put an emphasis on infrastructural projects to increase connectivity and further bolster Turkey’s role as a hub connecting the global East and West through Syria. This will partially be a competition for the US and Israel-devised India, Middle East, and Europe Corridor (IMEC), which envisions on-ground connectivity between the Gulf and Israel. Turkey and Qatar will likely try to facilitate the conditions for these related infrastructures to pass through Syrian and Turkish soil.
Iran’s response to these regional developments will likely be a major flashpoint for tensions in the Middle East over the coming year. This will likely prompt Tehran to further advance its nuclear project toward the point of assembling or getting as close as possible to assembling nuclear arms, significantly increasing Israel’s and the US-aligned camp’s threat perception. This aligns with developments from recent months in which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran has substantially increased its production of 60 percent enriched uranium, with the potential to produce approximately 34 kilograms per month, up from 4.7 kilograms per month at the Fordow enrichment facility alone. Recent estimations indicate that Iran now possesses a sufficient stockpile of fissile material, which could enable the development of multiple nuclear bombs withing a very short time span if it chooses to further enrich this stockpile to 90 percent (nuclear weapons-grade uranium).
As a result, Iran remains in significant defiance of the collapsed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and previous UN Security Council resolutions. This will likely trigger the “snap back” mechanism by European stakeholders. This is a legal mechanism to reintroduce European sanctions against Iran that were lifted under a 2015 UN resolution, which the E3 (France, Germany, the UK) already threatened to employ. This will likely be compounded with the likely prompt reintroduction of the US’s “Maximum Pressure” campaign under the incoming President Trump’s administration.
From Israel’s perspective, the combination of Iran’s enhanced nuclear enrichment and diminished regional power, as well as the incoming Trump administration, which is expected to align with the Israeli perception, will be viewed as a strategic window of opportunity to target Iran’s nuclear project. This view was echoed in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement, where he highlighted the need to focus on the Iranian threat as a key justification for pursuing a ceasefire with Hezbollah. For Israel, Iran and its nuclear program represent a paramount security threat. Jerusalem will, therefore, dedicate extensive efforts to coordinate and prepare a military action together with the new US administration and other regional allies in the Gulf, for when they perceive that there is a window of opportunity to prevent Iran from taking the final steps to acquire nuclear arms.
As a deterrent, Iran will reiterate its ballistic missile arsenal (estimated to stand at around 3000 missiles) and its capacity to block the Strait of Hormuz in times of crisis. It will also bolster its investment in its other primary regional allies, which currently entail its backed Shiite militias in Iraq and the Houthi movement in Yemen. Together, the Iran-led axis will likely increase their threatening posture vis-a-vis their rival camp of countries, which primarily include Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain. This will be used to convey to the US and the international community the ramifications of perceived anti-Iran military actions that cross Tehran’s red lines. If the scenario of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear sites materializes, Tehran will likely utilize the abovementioned capacities. Together with its regional allies, it will likely launch missiles extensively against Israel and the US-aligned camp of countries. It will also resort to block the Strait of Hormuz and destabilize the vital global shipping route of the Persian Gulf, which would be detrimental to the global supply chain and economy and thus be used as leverage.
All of the above will increase the prospects of further regional escalations in the Middle East in 2025, which would likely involve not only Israel and Iran but the other states in the Gulf and Levant region.
