As in 2024, Islamist groups will continue intensifying radicalization efforts aimed at Western Europe, utilizing global conflicts to disseminate anti-western propaganda. Transnational terrorist groups, including the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda, will continue to exploit global events and heightened societal tensions, particularly linked to the Israel-Hamas conflict, in their radicalization and recruitment efforts in Europe. According to Europol’s most recent Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT) report, 334 suspected Islamists were arrested in EU member countries in 2023, compared to 266 in 2022, pointing to increased prospects for radicalization. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of attacks, with at least 16 Islamist attacks being recorded on the continent in 2024 – the deadliest being the Moscow Crocus City Hall attack, claimed by IS Khorasan Province (ISKP), that killed 145 people. As such, Islamist terrorism will continue to pose the primary terrorist threat in Europe.
The primary risk of Islamist attacks will continue to stem from lone actors, rendering stabbings and vehicle ramming as the primary modus operandi. This is due to the accessibility and ease of executing such attacks. Moreover, the likelihood of more sophisticated attacks, namely such as IEDs, firearms, and even chemical and biological agents are also liable to increase. This is partly due to invigorated IS and al-Qaeda’s online dissemination of propaganda materials that call for locally initiated attacks and include instructions on how to assemble explosives and how to exploit security gaps to maximize damage.
The potential for such attacks succeeding is particularly elevated in countries where transnational groups still have a significant presence and on-ground capabilities – specifically Russia, given the entrenched presence of Islamists in the North Caucasus region, including ISKP cells. In the rest of the region, sophisticated attacks are more likely to fail, given that they require more resources, expertise, and communications between malign actors that are more prone to being intercepted, compounded by extensive counterterrorism and intelligence sharing in Western Europe. Nonetheless, the threat of rudimentary attacks will remain heightened in 2025, particularly in France and Germany, where authorities have foiled multiple plots in recent months. Moreover, as witnessed in 2024, the threat of Islamist terrorism is liable to increase in the Balkans, with two Islamist attacks recorded in Bosnia & Herzegovina and in Serbia in the past six months.
In addition to Islamist terrorism, the threat of far-right terrorism is expected to increase in 2025. This is due to the tendency of far-right extremists to capitalize on societal tensions to forward their narrative. This threat is amplified by growing political polarization, populism, and anti-immigrant sentiments in Western Europe. For instance, in the UK, violent unrest, riots, and attacks targeting individuals of foreign background occurred in July-August 2024 in response to a mass stabbing attack targeting children in Southport, England. This also highlights how terrorist attacks carried out by foreign nationals, such as the Magdeburg truck ramming attack on December 20, can serve as catalysts for far-right radicalization and violence. In addition to violent unrest, such incidents increase the likelihood of a premeditated far-right terrorist attack.
As with Islamist terrorism, lone actors continue to constitute the primary threat, with most far-right attacks since 2011 carried out by individual assailants. Unlike Islamist attackers, who are known to use various tactics, far-right extremists will continue to opt for firearms. This is in part due to symbolism, with far-right propaganda equating firearms with ideals of masculinity and power, and the tendency of far-right extremists to carry out copycat attacks. Notable attacks include the 2011 Oslo and Utoya attacks and the 2019 Christchurch Mosque shooting. However, attacks utilizing vehicles or bladed weapons are also likely, considering stringent firearm control in many European countries. While far-right extremism poses a regionwide threat, the potential for a successful attack is especially elevated in Austria, Germany, the Nordic countries, and the UK due to the existing presence of far-right extremist networks and rising anti-immigrant sentiments.
The political landscape in Europe is also expected to lead to an increase in radical far-left terrorism. However, unlike Islamists and far-right extremists, radical far-left actors are highly unlikely to carry out indiscriminate attacks. Far-left attacks are more likely to involve targeted attacks on symbols of capitalism or authority, contrary to indiscriminate attacks. Such targets include government buildings, police stations, educational institutions, and multinational companies. While far-left extremists are known to use IEDs and engage in arson, these attacks are aimed at causing significant property damage and can result in severe disruptions to business continuity. That said, the threat to personnel in such instances cannot be ruled out, as attacks have also taken place during working hours. Moreover, while rare, the potential for targeted attacks, including assassination attempts, on government officials or high-profile individuals in the private sector cannot be ruled out. This is especially so, given the December 4 assassination of a CEO of a major health insurance company in New York City, NY, USA, which could inspire highly radical actors in Europe.
As in past years, France, Germany, Greece, and Italy will remain hotspots for far-left extremism. Notably, in France and Germany, far-left groups are increasingly likely to engage in climate-related activism, targeting companies deemed as detrimental to the environment, as well as government institutions. In Greece, the potential for prolonged periods of radical far-left activity will remain elevated, with such periods triggered by proposed government policies and/or perceived government inaction.
In addition to domestic actors, Europe will also continue to face a heightened threat of state-backed terrorism in 2025. Iran will be a primary actor in that sphere. Since 1979, 102 Iran-backed plots, both successful and foiled, took place in Europe, of which, 54 plots were between 2021 and 2024. The main targets remain Iranian dissidents (including journalists), Israeli citizens and diplomats, and Jews. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) uses criminal actors to carry out external operations, with reports from 2024 indicating the IRGC is increasingly recruiting organized criminal groups in Sweden and France to act as its proxies.
While incidents in 2024 did not lead to casualties, the threat of a large Iran-backed attack on Jewish/Israeli targets will remain elevated in the short-to-medium term. Indeed, the IRGC was previously linked to attack plots involving explosives targeting Jewish community centers in Cyprus and Greece, which would have led to mass casualties if not thwarted. Moreover, the recruitment of organized criminal groups offers operational benefits to Tehran, as such criminals have higher local knowledge, contacts with other transnational criminal networks, and access to weapons. While authorities are on high alert, Iran is expected to continue engaging in covert criminal operations targeting dissidents and Jewish/Israeli individuals and entities. Separately, the threat of Russia-backed attacks targeting Russian dissidents and prominent Ukrainian figures in Europe also remains elevated. However, these attacks remain highly targeted and do not pose a significant threat to the general public.
