The threat of jihadist militancy has significantly evolved and intensified in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years, particularly as the Sahel region emerged as the epicenter of Islamist militant activity. In 2023, over half of all deaths due to jihadist militancy in the world were recorded in Sub-Saharan Africa, with 2024 on a similar path. Multiple militant groups, largely al-Qaeda or Islamic State (IS) affiliates, operate across the continent, with a significant amount of activity concentrated in the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin region, and Somalia. This is likely to remain the case as the groups further strengthen their footholds in key theaters, with attacks liable to continue on a steady increase overall and the security environment to further worsen. The current and future trajectory of militancy in Sub-Saharan Africa is driven by internal group capacity and motivation, as well as external factors that enable jihadists to capitalize on various gaps and power vacuums. This includes national political instability, weak security infrastructure, and complex ethno-social dynamics involving other armed actors.
The nexus between these factors and jihadist insurgencies somewhat functions in a cyclical manner as they fuel each other. A weak sociopolitical and security framework allows jihadist groups to recruit, expand, and entrench, which in turn further weakens the state and increases overall instability. This has been particularly acute in the Sahel, where multiple coups d’etat have created wide instability and seen intensified operations by jihadist groups. Burkina Faso is a notable example of this after two coups in 2022. It is estimated to be the country most affected by militancy in the world as fatalities from militancy almost quadrupled in 2024. Political instability in these circumstances not only pulls the government’s focus away from broader security responsibilities but also weakens low-level administration, allowing militants to move in and impose their own de facto control. Volatile political conditions across the Sahel, where post-coup transitions are delayed, a prolonged post-electoral crisis in Mozambique, and inter-state and regional tensions in Somalia, will continue to provide militants with significant advantages over the coming year.
In recent years, militant groups have had increasing success achieving control over territory, which is a central ideological objective for groups seeking to impose Islamist rule. This has been carried out in various areas of the continent with intimidation, propaganda, charity, Islamic jurisprudence, tax collection, and recruitment among vulnerable populations affected by poverty and other socioeconomic challenges. This is likely to remain the case as beyond fulfilling an ideological goal, territorial control allows jihadists to enforce authority at local levels, regulate economic activity, as well as enable illicit activity, such as smuggling, which sustains their operations. This also allows them to indoctrinate communities and bring them into ideological and religious alignment. Militants will continue to seek dominance through the assertion of various restrictions, including embargoes, taxes, and religious norms. Parallelly, they will continue to pursue greater influence with attacks on security forces, critical infrastructure, and civilians deemed to be non-Muslim or otherwise a threat, further eroding states’ capacity. Moreover, the groups’ links with local and transnational organized criminal and terror groups that engage in the trafficking of arms, drugs, people, and other commodities will continue to solidify as militant groups grow and require further funding. This is most significant in border regions of the Sahel or the Lake Chad basin, as well as other areas such as Somalia’s coast.
Militants will also continue to take advantage of the disorder created by other armed actors as well as state-allied militias across the continent. This is seen in Nigeria, where a proliferation of large-scale bandit and organized crime groups as well as other intercommunal violence have created larger gaps in security and allowed jihadists to spread geographically and increase violence. In Mali, the resurgence of the Azawad separatist movement in the north have distracted security forces and given the al-Qaeda affiliate, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam waal Muslimeen (JNIM), an avenue for cooperation against the government. Other countries like Burkina Faso, DRC, and Mozambique have an increase in locally initiated self-defense militias meant to combat jihadists but who also engage in extra-judicial violence against civilians, allowing militants to portray themselves as local protectors and boost their image. These complex dynamics, in which the presence of jihadists prompt the emergence of other armed groups, will continue as states struggle to address diverse and increasing security threats.
At the same time, the rivalry between jihadist groups contributes to the wider insecurity as well, largely between IS and other groups: IS and al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM in the Sahel; IS and al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab in Somalia; and IS and Boko Haram in Lake Chad. These groups have engaged in sporadic clashes over the years, where a clearer victory by one group can contribute to a minor stabilization as has happened in southern Somalia. However, while this does serve to have the groups weaken each other to some extent, this is often not permanent, and it otherwise contributes to security challenges as both groups target locals whom they perceive to cooperate with their rivals. This can also serve to exacerbate ethnic tensions and worsen intercommunal violence. This will also further continue to complicate the security landscape across the region.
Under these circumstances, the weakened security infrastructure as well as domestic and regional frameworks to combat militancy across jihadist theaters continue to threaten governments’ ability to curb the spread and further evolution of militancy. While countries like DRC, Mozambique, and Somalia have bilateral arrangements with regional partners for external security support, the overall foreign security presence across Sub-Saharan Africa has declined significantly in recent years. This is mainly due to increasing sovereigntist and nationalist policies of individual countries, particularly in the Sahel, effectively resulting in France, the US, and other Western countries’ withdrawal. While this has come with increased cooperation with Russia, this remains unlikely to successfully bridge the gap due to the limited number of Russian forces. Furthermore, Russian forces tend to contribute to insecurity in other ways, with widespread reports of human rights abuses. A decline in external support, combined with the countries’ individual resource constraints, is likely to continue to hinder counterinsurgency efforts.
Moreover, the jihadists are likely to showcase their overall ability to withstand the security operations and further expand their activity. These groups are also largely self-sufficient and rely on local means to fund their operations rather than external funding or fund allocation from central branches, suggesting their capabilities to sustain their operations across Sub-Saharan Africa irrespective of any changes in their central leadership or the overall context of global activities. Under these circumstances, militancy is poised to remain entrenched and further evolve across major operation theaters in the region in the coming years.
