The future of NATO in 2025 will be shaped by evolving geopolitical dynamics, emerging hybrid threats, and a shift in the role played by the USA under a second Trump presidency. Given that the USA is the largest contributor of military personnel, weapons, and expenditure to NATO, President Donald Trump’s approach to the alliance is expected to be the primary factor that defines its trajectory in 2025. The alliance’s future is expected to be marked with increasing uncertainties and internal friction, as well as stalled potential for any further expansion.
Trump’s stance on NATO during his first term and his recent election campaign were marked by skepticism about the alliance’s relevance and call for member states to increase their contributions. Trump has also repeatedly threatened to completely pull back from the alliance if his calls are not met. Despite such threats, such a scenario remains highly unlikely, given the strategic importance of the alliance to the USA’s national interests. As such, the USA is expected to keep its nuclear umbrella over NATO. However, in line with Trump’s foreign policy, the coming year will likely see a reduction in overall tangible support and contribution by the USA to the alliance, including reduced monetary support and a potential decrease in US troops deployed at NATO bases in Europe. Similar developments were recorded during his first term, with the Trump administration cutting its contribution to NATO’s direct budget from 22 to 16 percent in 2019.
With reduced US involvement in NATO, European member states are likely to take on a more prominent role in the alliance. This shift will be driven by both the need to address growing security threats from Russia and ongoing pressure from the US for European allies to meet and potentially exceed the minimum defense spending target of two percent of GDP by the end of 2024. In December, NATO announced that 23 out of its 32 members will meet or exceed this target by the end of 2024. However, ongoing debates within the alliance about raising this minimum criterion further to three percent of GDP are expected to foster internal tensions, especially with countries like Italy and Spain that are yet to meet the current criterion and will likely oppose such a push from the US and Eastern European countries. As such, increased internal friction is expected to be a defining aspect of NATO’s future in the coming year, especially after its June 2025 annual summit when the proposal for expanding this criterion is expected to be discussed.
Internal divisions within NATO are also expected to be exacerbated by several other factors. Trump’s leadership will likely result in a shift toward a more transactional relationship with allies, wherein US support – such as military aid, funding for joint exercises, and intelligence sharing – will be contingent upon tangible contributions from member states, including defense spending, troop deployment, and logistical support. In February 2024, Trump stated that he would not “protect” any NATO state that does not “pay its dues” from Russian hostility, emphasizing the expectation for member states to contribute more to collective defense efforts as a condition for US support. This is expected to lead to diplomatic friction between the USA and other NATO members.
Besides, disagreements among NATO members over the Ukraine conflict are likely to significantly impact the alliance’s ability to reach a unified policy consensus for Ukraine. Under Trump’s administration, the USA is anticipated to push to seek a negotiated agreement with Russia on the Ukraine conflict which will likely include conditions unacceptable to both Kyiv and some NATO members—particularly those in Eastern Europe. Moreover, with Trump strictly opposing admitting new members into the alliance, his return to office will block any prospects for further NATO expansion in the coming year, including for Ukraine and Georgia.
Regardless of whether or not a ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine materializes, Russia is expected to remain the primary security threat driving NATO’s policies in 2025. The alliance is expected to retain its focus on reinforcing its “deterrence and defense” posture, including its eight battle groups along Europe’s eastern borders, to combat potential threats from Russia. The alliance is also expected to revise and adapt its strategy for protecting its critical underwater infrastructure, potentially expanding its defense initiatives to include more advanced monitoring and protection systems in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and other strategic maritime routes. Multiple incidents of Russian sabotage operations targeting underwater cables and pipelines exposed vulnerabilities of such critical assets in 2024. Other threats that will drive NATO’s policies are expected to include terrorism, as well as other non-traditional threats such as cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.
Additionally, while the Russian threat will inform NATO’s primary focus, attention to China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, as well as its capabilities to carry out sabotage and espionage within Europe, is likely to increase. High-level dialogue and joint military training and exercises are likely to increase with the alliance’s Asia-Pacific partners, namely Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. However, this shift will remain in the background, as NATO continues to prioritize its strategic interests in Europe.
