Overview
Heavy fighting continues to take place between Russian and Ukrainian forces along the 1,000-kilometer-long frontline in Ukraine, as the conflict enters its fourth year in 2025. Russian forces reportedly gained 4,168 square kilometers of territory in the conflict in 2024, making significant advances in the Donetsk region and capturing key settlements in Ukraine. Kyiv, on the other hand, continues to occupy significant territory in the Kursk region of Russia, as of January. However, both sides have experienced significant losses of both personnel and equipment, with Russian forces suffering 420,000 casualties in 2024. Meanwhile, incoming US President Donald Trump has stated that he will recalibrate the USA’s foreign policy toward the conflict, calling for negotiations over a ceasefire deal. Both Ukraine and Russia have indicated willingness to engage in such negotiations, albeit on different terms.
MAX forecasts three main scenarios regarding the trajectory of the conflict, alongside their likelihood as percentages and impact in 2025. The following sections then explore the impact of potential ceasefire negotiations in the conflict on other regions, including Africa, Americas, the Middle East, and Asia.
Scenario 1: Russia & Ukraine successfully negotiate a ceasefire deal (60%)
With US President-elect Donald Trump indicating that he will attempt to negotiate a ceasefire deal between Russia and Ukraine, Kyiv and Moscow are pushing toward maximizing their territorial gains before Trump’s inauguration in January to negotiate from a position of strength. Multiple factors are likely to push Putin and Zelensky to negotiate a ceasefire deal in 2025. Trump has repeatedly threatened to reduce military aid for Kyiv if Zelensky refuses negotiations. Considering that Washington is Kyiv’s largest aid provider, this will impede Ukraine’s ability to sustain military operations. Secondly, Trump’s administration has alluded to the possibility of offering incentives to Moscow, such as the easing of sanctions, to convince Putin to join negotiations. Conversely, they have also indicated they are open to using pressure tactics, such as increasing aid to Ukraine, if Putin refuses to join talks. Thirdly, Russia and Ukraine are suffering from significant troop and equipment losses.
Putin is expected to insist on Ukraine abandoning its NATO aspirations, coupled with Moscow retaining control over the Russian-occupied territories in eastern and southern Ukraine, as non-negotiable terms. This is especially so as Putin is seeking to dispel perceptions of a “weakened Russia,” following the fall of the Moscow-backed Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, which has threatened Russia’s strategic foothold in the Middle East. Reportedly, the Trump administration is considering a deal that delays Ukraine’s NATO membership by 20 years, “freezes” the conflict along the current frontlines, and creates a demilitarized buffer zone between Russian and Ukrainian forces. Although Moscow previously rejected calls to freeze the conflict, it will likely view the Trump administration’s proposal as the least objectionable option, as it would allow Russia to maintain de facto control over 20 percent of Ukrainian territory. Further, by postponing Ukraine’s NATO membership, Putin can portray the ceasefire deal as a victory.
While Kyiv has previously rejected ceasefire proposals allowing Russia to retain control over occupied territories, Zelensky is liable to compromise on the issue in exchange for the inclusion of Kyiv-administered territories in Ukraine within NATO and leaving the status of Russia-occupied territories out of the scope of talks. However, given that Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and the USA oppose the accession of Ukraine to NATO, Zelensky will likely be forced to compromise and forego NATO membership in exchange for alternative security guarantees.
A ceasefire secured on these terms will remain highly fragile considering that any deal that merely freezes the conflict and does not settle the status of occupied regions will be prone to violations. This was seen in the aftermath of the 2014-2015 Minsk Agreements that froze the conflict in eastern Ukraine and led to frequent ceasefire violations, with a proxy war continuing in the Donbas region. Alternatively, if the ceasefire holds for at least six months, Ukraine will be able to lift martial law, hold new elections, commence post-war reconstruction, and pursue a long-term armistice with Russia by the end of 2025.
Scenario 2: Protracted conflict continues with Russia and/or Ukraine rejecting ceasefire deal (35%)
Russia is liable to reject a ceasefire deal if it makes significant territorial advances and captures logistical hubs in eastern Ukraine in early 2025, prompting Putin to assess that Russia can achieve its goals militarily. Moreover, Putin is likely to face pressure from Russian ultranationalists to intensify operations in Ukraine to compensate for the setback in Syria. Some ultranationalists have reportedly urged the Kremlin to reject any “inconclusive ceasefire deal,” such as the one that led to the ousting of Assad in Syria. Meanwhile, Ukraine is liable to reject a deal, if does not receive a clear timeline for NATO accession or other security guarantees in lieu of NATO membership. If Russia and/or Ukraine reject a ceasefire deal, the current attritional conflict will likely continue, at least through the first half of 2025.
Scenario 3: Russia or Ukraine secure a decisive victory (5%)
Based on the conflict’s trajectory, there is a low likelihood of Russia or Ukraine securing a decisive victory in the conflict. For Moscow, a victory implies ousting the Zelensky-led government and establishing full control over the annexed regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia, among other goals. This is highly unlikely to occur, as it is contingent on the cessation of Western aid to Ukraine and complete collapse of the Ukrainian military. For Kyiv, a decisive victory implies the withdrawal of Russian forces from occupied Ukrainian regions and restoration of the 2022 borders at the very least. This is also unlikely to occur, as Russian forces outnumber Ukrainian troops and have an upper hand in the eastern frontline regions.
Africa’s role within Russian global policy to potentially affect Moscow’s negotiations over Ukraine
Over recent years, Russia has significantly increased its influence in Sub-Saharan Africa, leveraging various strategies to entrench its presence in the region. Beyond active diplomacy, one of its primary tools has been the deployment of private military contractors (PMCs) affiliated with or directly linked to Moscow. This approach aims to diminish Western influence as part of a broader geopolitical struggle while also granting Russia access to the region’s abundant natural resources, including gold, diamonds, and uranium. Russia has positioned itself as an anti-colonial force, capitalizing on prevalent anti-Western sentiment, and used this narrative to influence public opinion, political leaders, and military officials in several nations. Additionally, Russia has offered security assistance, proposing PMCs as an alternative to Western forces or UN peacekeepers, whose efforts to contain insecurity have been perceived as inadequate. This strategy has been particularly evident in CAR, where Russia effectively controls the security apparatus, political framework, and economy. Similarly, in the Sahel region, military coups have facilitated the expulsion of Western forces, paving the way for direct Russian influence and the deployment of PMCs.
This trend persisted even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with reports suggesting that this had little effect on their PMC manpower in Africa even as requirements increased in Europe. This is likely indicative of the overall Russian posture to use relatively minimal commitments in Africa to reap larger rewards. However, it is possible that in the absence of the war in Ukraine, Russia’s presence on the continent would have been more substantial, and thus an end to the war will enable them to accelerate their operations in Africa.
This is challenged by the weakening of Russia’s strategic posture in the Middle East following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria. This development has disrupted Russia’s ability to support its African operations, as its naval and aerial presence in Syria previously served as a critical logistical hub for transporting personnel and equipment to Libya and subsequently to other parts of Africa. Without access to Syrian bases, Russia must rely directly on Libya, a route hindered by NATO sanctions that prohibit Russian aircraft from flying over Europe and by Turkey’s near-complete naval blockade in the Black Sea, which prevents Russian warships from passing through the Bosphorus Strait into the Mediterranean Sea.
Given the strategic importance Russia places on Africa, these logistical obstacles may influence its approach to negotiations over the Ukraine conflict. Moscow might seek concessions that facilitate access to Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in light of changes in the US administration. If such demands are met, Russia could maintain and potentially expand its presence on the continent. Conversely, if negotiations fail or collapse, Russia’s ability to support its African operations will likely diminish over time. This could force adjustments in PMC deployments and stall plans for further expansion. In CAR, where Russia faces relatively less resistance from armed groups, it is expected to retain control over the mining sector and the broader security landscape with minimal personnel investment. However, in the Sahel, Russian PMCs face more capable militant groups, particularly in Mali. Logistical challenges may undermine or delay plans to enhance operations in Niger and Burkina Faso, further complicating Russia’s efforts to strengthen its influence in the region.
Limited economic impact to occur across Americas amid potential Russia-Ukraine ceasefire with disinformation campaigns for pro-Russian narrative to persist
The USA has historically maintained relatively limited direct trade relationships with both Ukraine and Russia, which has continued despite sanctions and regulations but at a significantly diminished rate amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. However, the US was affected as several key sectors, particularly energy, agricultural products, and semiconductors, experienced indirect exposure to the global impacts of the conflict. As the conflict persisted, the impact on these sectors has been nullified through a combination of factors including increased US wheat production and expanded agricultural subsidies, as well as the development of alternative supply chains for oil. In this context, although a potential cessation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict will likely contribute to greater stability in global energy markets by allowing for predictable supply chains and reducing price volatility, a dramatic impact on the US economy directly remains unlikely.
While Russia has deepened political and economic relations with several countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) Region, such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, its investments and trade in the region has been limited compared to China, EU, and the USA. Thus, a potential ceasefire is unlikely to have a dramatic effect on LAC’s economic prospects. That said, a ceasefire will likely improve supply chains of agri-food and energy products such as petroleum, fertilizers, and coal, plausibly decreasing prices. Furthermore, if as part of a potential ceasefire, US removes or relaxes sanctions on Russian energy exports, it could reduce demand for Latin American oil producers such as Venezuela and Brazil.
Meanwhile, regardless of the conclusions of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia is likely to maintain its efforts to maintain and grow support from the LAC countries. Russia’s vision of creating a multipolar world order has the LAC playing a major role, as also reiterated by Russian Foreign Ministry in April 2024. For this, Moscow is liable to leverage its trade policy with certain countries dependent on imports of oil products from Russia to push for anti-West actions. In January 2024, Russia curtailed banana imports from Ecuador in response to Ecuador considering a US proposal to exchange Soviet-era equipment for modern weapons destined for Ukraine. The Ecuador government later canceled the plan as a result.
Moreover, Russia will continue to engage with social media influencers and local media in several countries across the Americas to spread disinformation and conspiracy theories regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Such disinformation campaigns will focus on showing Russia as the “victor” in a potential ceasefire scenario while continuing to foster anti-West sentiments and positioning itself as an ally by exploiting pre-existing grievances of US-interventionism in the LAC. Conclusively, while the Russia-Ukraine conflict has significantly disrupted global markets and geopolitics, the potential for a ceasefire offers an opportunity for stabilization, particularly in energy and agricultural sectors. However, its broader impact on the USA and Latin America remains nuanced, with economic recovery likely, but geopolitical dynamics continuing to shape the region’s future.
Ceasefire in Russia-Ukraine conflict to gradually ease energy, food prices in Asia, weaken North Korea’s alliance with Russia
The direct repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine conflict for most of Asia have been limited, while the impact has been more pronounced in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Countries like Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, which maintain close trade relations with Russia, have experienced significant economic setbacks due to a downturn in exports to the Russian market. This economic strain was exacerbated by declining remittances and reduced investment flows from Russia. In terms of the conflict’s indirect impact, elevated oil and food prices affected the entire region, given that Russia and Ukraine collectively account for a substantial proportion of global food and energy exports.
In the event of a resolution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, even through a tenuous ceasefire, it is expected to alleviate inflationary pressures and reduce utility costs for energy-import-dependent, large global economies like Japan and South Korea. However, such changes will be gradual due to multiple factors including damage to Russian infrastructure, likely fragility of a ceasefire, and the reorientation of oil importing countries to other suppliers since 2022. As such, regional oil exporters such as Azerbaijan, Brunei, Kazakhstan, Papua New Guinea, and Turkmenistan are likely to retain their position as significant energy and oil exporters in the coming term.
Meanwhile, food prices are likely to maintain their current levels in the initial months after a ceasefire as production and supply of sunflower seed oil, wheat, barley, corn, and fertilizers – of which Russia and Ukraine are key producers – will continue to be impacted as both countries recover from the war, especially Ukraine. In the longer term, a gradual decrease in fertilizer prices will see the eventual restoration of pre-war trade flows, particularly for rice-producing nations like Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Thailand, and Vietnam, which rely heavily on potash, nitrogen, and phosphate fertilizers imported from Russia, the world’s largest fertilizer exporter. As a result, access to basic foodstuffs such as rice is expected to improve across Asia, though this is expected to take months to take effect.
A negotiated settlement to the Russia-Ukraine war is liable to increase concerns over the US’ willingness to continue its participation in international conflicts under incoming President Trump. The perceptions of a partial realignment of the US’ priorities will likely prompt regional US allies to bolster their defense policies, especially those located in geopolitically tense regions, such as Japan, South Korea, and to a lesser extent Taiwan. Such realignment can be seen in Japan’s increase in defense expenditure in 2024 and increasing public discourse surrounding the development of a domestic nuclear weapons program in South Korea.
The increasing cooperation between North Korea and Russia has also fueled concerns over Russian support emboldening Pyongyang to assume a more aggressive posture on the Korean Peninsula and possibly invading South Korea. However, the potential for full-scale hostilities on the peninsula will reduce with the end of the Russia-Ukraine war. This is because the Moscow-Pyongyang mutual defense pact of June 2024 – under which the North has been providing weapons and troops for deployment in Ukraine – was borne out of both countries’ international isolation and stretched resources. An end to the war will likely reduce Russia’s need for such a close alliance with Pyongyang, though Russia will likely remain obligated by the pact to assist Pyongyang with its military modernization program, particularly regarding ballistic missile technology. Similarly, despite China’s more measured support to Russia, the incoming US administration’s expected stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict is liable to somewhat shake Taiwan’s confidence in Washington’s willingness to earnestly defend the island in case of full-scale conflict with China. However, in contrast to US policy in Ukraine explicitly ruling out Washington’s direct military intervention in the conflict, the US maintains “strategic ambiguity” regarding Taiwan, implying the potential for US forces to be mobilized should China invade Taiwan. This, coupled with Beijing’s desire to focus on its faltering domestic economy, indicate that a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine conflict will not alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
De-escalation in Russia-Ukraine conflict unlikely to impact Russia’s ties with Iran, presence in Libya
The anticipated de-escalation in the Russia-Ukraine conflict will marginally alter the dynamic between Iran and Russia, whose cooperation has significantly deepened during the conflict with the former providing military equipment to Moscow. However, it is unlikely to substantially derail the strengthening of their relationship in the coming year. While Moscow’s immediate reliance on Iranian military supplies may decline as battlefield needs diminish, the overarching strategic alignment between the two countries will ensure continued cooperation across several fields.
Iran’s provision of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), ballistic missiles, and other military equipment during the war bolstered its position as a crucial partner for Russia. Tehran sought to leverage this partnership to obtain advanced equipment, such as Su-35 aircraft to modernize its air force, or Russian cyber expertise. Iranian efforts to strengthen its military and cyber capabilities through such cooperation will remain, particularly as tensions with Israel are expected to persist. While the possibility of Moscow deprioritizing this cooperation amid a potentially waning dependence on Iranian arms exists, such a shift remains improbable. This is underscored by the slated signing of a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement” in January 2025 which mirrors a similar Russian agreement with North Korea that included a mutual defense clause and was followed by the deployment of North Korean troops to Ukraine.
Economically, the still underdeveloped Russo-Iranian partnership will be bolstered, rooted in both countries’ ongoing need to circumvent Western sanctions and exclusion from the SWIFT system. This is already being seen by efforts to boost bilateral trade and the integration of Iran’s Shetab and Russia’s Mir networks. Given that neither country is expected to reenter the Western-dominated global energy and financial markets, Moscow and Tehran will continue to capitalize on this arrangement to mitigate their economic isolation. However, these measures are unlikely to significantly alleviate the broader economic challenges Iran faces, including a faltering economy constrained by sanctions, a depreciating currency and a domestic energy crisis.
Over the next year, Libya can be expected to become an increasingly important element of Russia’s Mediterranean and African strategy. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria, previously a cornerstone of Moscow’s 2022 Maritime Doctrine, will result in diminished Russian influence in the Levant and a scaled-back or potentially zero presence in the country. This was further highlighted by recent reports indicating a redeployment of military assets and personnel from its bases, including its Tartus naval facility which is integral to Moscow given its status as the only Russian base in the Mediterranean. Hence, Russia’s need to maintain access to the Mediterranean and bolster its logistical and operational bases in the region, including sub-Saharan Africa, will prompt Moscow to intensify its footprint in Libyan National Army (LNA)-controlled eastern Libya. While this shift is likely to take place regardless of the status of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it may be accelerated by the potential cessation of hostilities with Ukraine which will allow Moscow to shift its focus towards Libya.
In this context, Russia will attempt to expand its economic and security arrangements with LNA Chief Khalifa Haftar, potentially seeking the establishment of a Russian naval base in the country. However, Haftar could be wary of alienating Western powers, including the US, and refrain from fully aligning with Moscow. Regardless, Russia will likely employ destabilizing tactics aimed at exerting greater influence in Libya, such as continuing to provide Russian-printed Libyan dinars to the LNA to bolster the latter’s financial autonomy and exacerbate the GNU’s liquidity crisis. Overall, Moscow remains unlikely to completely supplant Syria but will instead focus its efforts on gradually expanding its influence in Libya.
